Adversarial Diversity and Hard Positive Generation by Rozsa, Andras et al.
Adversarial Diversity and Hard Positive Generation
Andras Rozsa, Ethan M. Rudd, and Terrance E. Boult∗
University of Colorado at Colorado Springs
Vision and Security Technology (VAST) Lab
{arozsa,erudd,tboult}@vast.uccs.edu
Abstract
State-of-the-art deep neural networks suffer from a fun-
damental problem – they misclassify adversarial examples
formed by applying small perturbations to inputs. In this
paper, we present a new psychometric perceptual adversar-
ial similarity score (PASS) measure for quantifying adver-
sarial images, introduce the notion of hard positive genera-
tion, and use a diverse set of adversarial perturbations – not
just the closest ones – for data augmentation. We introduce
a novel hot/cold approach for adversarial example gener-
ation, which provides multiple possible adversarial pertur-
bations for every single image. The perturbations generated
by our novel approach often correspond to semantically
meaningful image structures, and allow greater flexibility
to scale perturbation-amplitudes, which yields an increased
diversity of adversarial images. We present adversarial
images on several network topologies and datasets, includ-
ing LeNet on the MNIST dataset, and GoogLeNet and
ResidualNet on the ImageNet dataset. Finally, we demon-
strate on LeNet and GoogLeNet that fine-tuning with a
diverse set of hard positives improves the robustness of these
networks compared to training with prior methods of gen-
erating adversarial images.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks are powerful learning models which
have been successfully applied to vision, speech and many
other tasks [9, 11, 18, 19, 10, 20, 4, 3]. Szegedy et al.
[21] showed that several machine learning models, includ-
ing state-of-the-art deep neural networks, misclassify small
non-random perturbations of correctly classified images. In
many cases, these misclassifications are made with high
confidence. Szegedy et al. [21] dubbed these perturbed mis-
classified samples adversarial examples. In order to gener-
alize well, deep neural networks are expected to be robust
to moderate perturbations to their inputs. Thus adversarial
examples, with only small perturbations, are problematic.
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Figure 1: ADVERSARIALS AND HARD POSITIVES. This
paper demonstrates how to generate a much more diverse set
of adversarial examples than the existing L-BFGS [21] or fast
gradient sign (FGS) [8] methods. Via a range of perturbation
amplitudes along the learnt adversarial directions – not just the
closest adversarial sample – we can generate hard positives to
fine-tune the class definitions, thereby extending previously over-
fit decision boundaries to improve both accuracy and robustness.
The extended decision boundaries are represented by dashed lines.
This simplified schematic uses shapes to depict different types of
hard positive examples. Inner colors depict the original class,
while outer colors depict the classification by the base network.
For better visualization we show only one input image with corre-
sponding adversarial/hard positive examples for each class.
A deeper problem is that the generated adversarial
images are relatively portable across different neural net-
works, which means that they are consistently misclassified
by models of similar network architectures trained on vary-
ing training data, with different hyperparameters, or even
different numbers of layers or types of activations [21].
While one classification error is a simple practical prob-
lem, these highly unexpected recognition errors suggest a
more fundamental problem. Namely, the combinations of
training samples and algorithms that we use to train our net-
works are not sufficient.
At their core, adversarial examples are nothing more
than perturbed versions of ordinary examples that cause
unexpected recognition mistakes in networks. This suggests
that the adversarial problem can be addressed by finding
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ways to efficiently augment the training set with represen-
tative adversarial examples which increase the diversity and
thus generalization of the training set. Enhancing the train-
ing set is a common technique in machine learning and has
been applied by others to deep neural networks. For exam-
ple, Bengio et al. [2] demonstrated that deep networks ben-
efit even more from out-of-distribution examples including
perturbed versions of the original training examples.
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
1. We introduce a new measure to quantify adversarial
images using a novel Perceptual Adversarial Similarity
Score (PASS), which is more consistent with human
perception than prior Lp norm measurements.
2. We introduce a new approach which is capable of gen-
erating large numbers of diverse adversarial images.
3. While researchers have focused on generating the clos-
est adversarial images, we argue that to augment train-
ing sets and thereby improve accuracy and robustness
of learning models, it is better to use hard positives
formed by non-minimal perturbations. We demon-
strate that these non-minimal hard positives are more
effective for training than existing adversarial models.
2 Related Work
While not called adversarial examples, the oldest work
related to our research is the use of perturbations and/or
hard negative mining for training. Introducing perturba-
tions to inputs to improve learning machines is a long stand-
ing method in machine learning, e.g., it was used when the
MNIST dataset [12] was introduced and put forward as a
training methodology in [17]. Research by Loosli et al.
[14] took perturbation-enhanced training to a new level and
developed an open source tool called InfiMNIST [14] that
produces MNIST examples by applying small affine trans-
formations and noise to the original images.
In detection problems, where the number of negatives
can be enormous, a related technique is hard negative min-
ing in which naturally occurring but “hard” and hence infor-
mative examples are used to improve training, e.g., [6].
Baluja et al. [1] proposed a related approach which gen-
erates perturbations and applies them to the inputs, observ-
ing how multiple trained networks respond to each input.
Their method applies small affine image transformations
without having any knowledge about the inner states of the
networks. They used peer networks as a control-mechanism
to filter out radical perturbations and to identify which per-
turbations are useful for retraining. However, random per-
turbations can be an inefficient technique to generate good
training data, since a good system will correctly classify the
vast majority of such inputs. We generated one million new
examples with InfiMNIST and tested them on three dif-
ferently trained LeNet [13] networks to identify adversar-
ial examples among these images. The results show that
the proportion of adversarial examples in the InfiMNIST
dataset is very small – 2.199±0.132% – which means that
finding the small affine transformations that form adversar-
ial examples via this method is computationally non-trivial.
Although capable of finding high-value training examples,
these types of guess and check approaches, which perform
random perturbations and determine if the results are mis-
classified, can be prohibitively expensive.
The idea of using optimization and internal network state
to find adversarial examples in machine learning models
was introduced in [21]. The authors also demonstrated the
first method to reliably find those perturbations via small
adjustments to pixel values. The approach relies on a box-
constrained optimization technique (L-BFGS) which, start-
ing from a randomly chosen direction, aims to find the
smallest perturbation in the input space that causes the per-
turbed image to be classified as a predefined target label.
Szegedy et al. [21] performed several experiments on a few
varying networks and datasets, including MNIST [12], and
demonstrated that the same adversarial example is often
misclassified by different networks.
In [8], Goodfellow et al. presented a simpler and compu-
tationally cheaper algorithm to produce small perturbations
causing unexpected recognition errors. Their approach –
the fast gradient sign (FGS) method – creates perturbations
by using the sign of the gradient of loss with respect to
the input, and the required gradient can be effectively cal-
culated using backpropagation. Experiments in the paper
demonstrated that FGS reliably causes a wide variety of
learning models to misclassify their perturbed inputs. It
is important to note that while both L-BFGS and FGS use
gradient information, FGS is much faster because the gra-
dient is used only once as an explicit direction for a line-
search, as opposed to L-BFGS, which performs many gra-
dient computations. Stepping in the direction of the sign of
the gradient of loss with respect to the input image contin-
uously reduces the classification score of the original class
until another class obtains a higher score. Assuming that
the original classification was correct, this causes a classi-
fication error. The resulting perturbation images look like
dense random noise. Rather than producing images for
training, the paper suggests using an improved objective
function which directly incorporates the sign of the gradi-
ent of loss. That model reduces the average classification
error rate from 0.99% to 0.782% on MNIST.
A fundamentally different approach from [21, 8] was
proposed by Sabour et al.[16]. The approach seeks to find
not only adversarial images that are misclassified; it also
seeks bounded error inputs that have internal representa-
tions which are closest to guide images. In their work, the
authors demonstrate that adversarial examples can be pro-
duced which are not only incorrectly classified at the out-
put layer, but are also close to any specified internal rep-
resentations of the network. They use L-BFGS to find the
adversarial images which mimic the internal representations
of targeted images, also demonstrating that the adversarial
problem is more complex than just mapping output errors.
In all research that uses explicitly optimized adversar-
ial images to improve networks, the authors aim to synthe-
size the perturbations of smallest difference (by some mea-
sure) that cause misclassification. By contrast, we further
amplify adversarial perturbations over a diverse range to
obtain additional hard positives to retrain our networks.
3 PASS
Different measures have been used in the literature to quan-
tify adversarial images; commonly Lp norms [21, 8, 1].
These works implicitly agree that adversarial images are
modified inputs which cause unexpected recognition errors
in machine learning models, yet are correctly classified
by humans. Sabour et al. concluded that Lp measures
are not well matched to human perception [16]. Consis-
tent with [7], this suggests that adversarial images should
be quantified in terms of just noticeable difference. How-
ever, a natural interpretation of imperceptible should also
allow many transformations, including small translations
and rotations, which result in images that are perturbed to
noticeable extents compared to their original counterparts,
yet still appear to be plausible samples of the same images
– samples that a network should not get wrong. Consider a
biometric face verification system under attack: viewpoint
variations result in noticeably different images that a human
operator still perceives as a different view of the same input.
If the distortions are too large, e.g., a face with reversed
aspect ratio or a very noisy image, a human operator would
likely notice a clear problem with the data even if he or she
could still discern the identity of the person in the image.
To quantify the degree to which an image is adversar-
ial, we therefore seek a psychometric measure which con-
siders not only element-wise similarity but also plausibility
that the image in question is a different view of the same
input. We perform this measurement as a two stage pro-
cess: aligning the perturbed image with the original, then
measuring similarity of the aligned images. Due to potential
radiometric and noise differences between the images, sim-
ple correlation or feature-based alignments may not work
very well. Instead, we maximize the enhanced correlation
coefficient (ECC) [5] between the adversarial image x˜ and
the original image x. Let ψ(x˜, x) be a homography trans-
form from adversarial image x˜ to the original image x, with
3× 3 homography matrixH. We optimize the objective
argmin
H
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ x||x|| − ψ(x˜, x)||ψ(x˜, x)||
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ , (1)
where an overline (·) denotes the zero-mean version of
an image. The x minimizing Eq. 1 will maximize
ECC(ψ(x˜, x), x).
The second stage of our comparison measures similarity.
Previous work [21, 16] has predominantly quantified the
degree of adversarial in terms of element-wise L2 or L∞
distances. However, these norms are extremely sensitive
to small geometric distortions and do not map well to psy-
chophysical notions of similarity, even under non-geometric
perturbations; even after alignment, a single pixel-wise dif-
ference along a strong edge is all it takes to maximize the
L∞ distance between two very similar images.
Research by [22] suggests that the human visual system
is most sensitive to changes in structural patterns and devel-
oped the structural similarity (SSIM) index as an objective
for lossy image compression. SSIM quantifies similarity of
image pairs based on structural and brightness differences.
Given two images, x and y, let L(x, y), C(x, y), and
S(x, y) be luminance, contrast, and structural measures,
respectively defined as
L(x, y) =
[
2µxµy + C1
µx2 + µy2 + C1
]
C(x, y) =
[
2σxσy + C2
σx2 + σy2 + C2
]
S(x, y) =
[
σxy + C3
σxσy + C3
]
,
where µx, σx, and σxy are weighted mean, variance, and
covariance respectively and Ci’s are constants to prevent
singularity. With these, the regional SSIM index (RSSIM)
is defined as
RSSIM(x, y) = L(x, y)αC(x, y)βS(x, y)γ , (2)
where α, β, and γ are chosen to reflect relative importance
of luminance, contrast, and structure respectively. For con-
sistency with [22], we set α = β = γ = 1, and use an
11 × 11 kernel of σ = 1.5 for weights. SSIM is then
obtained by taking the average of RSSIM over all pixels:
for an m-pixel image,
SSIM(x, y) =
1
m
m∑
n=1
RSSIM(xn, yn). (3)
We combine the photometric-invariant homography trans-
form alignment with SSIM to define the perceptual adver-
sarial similarity score (PASS) between x˜ and x as
PASS(x˜, x) = SSIM(ψ(x˜, x), x). (4)
PASS then serves as a similarity measure to quantify how
adversarial a misclassified image is. While previous works
quantified adversarial in terms of some similarity or dissim-
ilarity measure, both Szegedy et al. [21] and Goodfellow et
al. [8] mention a constraint which they implicitly assume
but do not explicitly define: namely, in order to be adver-
sarial perturbations must be imperceptible. Mathematical
definitions purely in terms of Lp norms do not operationally
enforce such a constraint; the perturbation of minimum Lp
norm may be quite perceptible for certain images. Insofar
as PASS serves as a psychometric, we can use it to make
this constraint explicit. Let y be the label of x, let f be the
(a) Fast Gradient Sign
PASS=0.727, L2=0.990, L∞=13
(b) Fast Gradient Value
PASS=0.979, L2=0.196, L∞=22
(c) Hot/Cold - 1
PASS=0.977, L2=0.198, L∞=22
(d) Hot/Cold - 2
PASS=0.965, L2=0.239, L∞=24
Figure 2: ADVERSARIALS ON LENET/MNIST. Adversarial examples and perturbations for an input image classified as digit 9
with metrics shown below images in form (PASS, L2 norm per pixel, L∞). (a) Fast Gradient Sign method: adversarial classified as 4 (b)
Fast Gradient Value approach: adversarial classified as 4 (c) Hot/Cold approach with the most similar class: adversarial classified as 4
(d) Hot/Cold approach with the second most similar class: adversarial classified as 2. Perturbation-visualization: black=-1, white=+1,
gray=no-change.
classifier, and let τ ∈ [0, 1] be a threshold on perceptible
PASS values. Then an adversarial image is defined as
argmin
d(x,x˜)
x˜ : f(x˜) 6= y and PASS(x, x˜) ≥ τ, (5)
where d(x, x˜) is some dissimilarity measure, e.g., 1 −
PASS(x, x˜) or ||x − x˜||p – potentially constrained along
the directions learnt by an adversarial generation algorithm.
Note that the value of τ may vary depending on the net-
work and the dataset, but for any fixed domain this gives a
quantitative adversarial threshold. Hard positives are simi-
larly constrained by a PASS threshold, but need not be the
samples of minimum dissimilarity.
4 Adversarial Example Generation
In this section, we first provide an overview of the notations
that we use. We then discuss an existing method for gen-
erating adversarial examples. Finally, we introduce a novel
method for adversarial image and hard positive generation
and discuss implementation details.
Let θ be the parameters of the model, x ∈ [0, 255]m
the m-pixel image of integer values applied as input to the
network, y the label of x, J(θ, x, y) the cost used to train
the neural network, and f be the learnt classifier that maps
input images to a discrete set of n labels. Let Bl(·) be the
backpropagation operator defined in Sec. 4.3.
For a given input image x classified as y, our goal is to
produce perturbation η such that perturbed image x˜ = x+η
is adversarial according to Eq. 5. To generate hard positives,
we simply scale η by a constant ≥ 1.
4.1 Fast Gradient Value
We commence our research using the fast gradient sign
(FGS) method introduced in [8], but seek greater adversar-
ial diversity. An obvious extension of FGS is to consider a
scaled version of the raw gradient of loss instead of using
only the sign of the gradient. We refer to this as fast gradient
value (FGV), and we show that it produces notably different
adversarial perturbations. Specifically, the direction deter-
mined by
ηgrad = ∇xJ(θ, x, y) (6)
does not ignore the differences in gradient magnitude
between corresponding pixels as FGS does. The intuition
here is that to effectively increase the loss with minimal
distortion, pixels with larger gradients in terms of L1 norm
need to be changed more radically than others. Compared
to FGS, this slight modification leads to different directions
where significantly different adversarial examples exist.
As shown in Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 3(a), the adversarial per-
turbations produced by the FGS method cover almost the
entire image, including the “background”. By contrast,
using raw gradient of loss, shown in Fig. 2(b) and Fig. 3(b),
generates more focused perturbations that cause less struc-
tural damage resulting in higher PASS as we can see in
Fig. 5. Still, FGS and FGV approaches combined produce
only two adversarial examples per input image, and it is nat-
ural to ask if we can generate more.
4.2 Hot/Cold Approach
The intuition behind FGS and FGV is to decrease the
response to the class of interest by following the direction
of the gradient of loss. To generate hard positives which
augment overfit decision boundaries between classes, how-
ever, it seems natural to consider derivatives with respect
to other layers, and generate adversarial examples which
change classifications while moving toward a specific tar-
geted class. Our idea is related to [15], which introduced a
method called image inverting, designed to reconstruct an
image which minimizes the loss for given class represented
by a one-hot feature vector in the penultimate layer. We
postulated that inverting a one-hot vector – a vector with one
non-zero (hot) element and the remaining elements zeros –
at the penultimate layer would eventually create features in
lower layers that are exclusive to the selected hot class, and
other features responsible for neutralizing other classes rep-
resented by zeros in the penultimate layer (non-hot classes).
We extend that concept by adding the “cold” class, to fur-
ther decrease the role of the current class. Specifically, we
craft features for the penultimate layer, the last layer before
softmax. At that layer each value is still associated with a
particular output class, so we can define directions in the
(a) BVLC-GoogLeNet: FGS
PASS=0.341, L2=0.162, L∞=21
(b) BVLC-GoogLeNet: FGV
PASS=0.663, L2=0.089, L∞=120
(c) BVLC-GoogLeNet: HC-1
PASS=0.986, L2=0.012, L∞=25
(d) BVLC-GoogLeNet: HC-13
PASS=0.975, L2=0.016, L∞=25
(e) ResNet-152: FGS
PASS=0.917, L2=0.031, L∞=4
(f) ResNet-152: FGV
PASS=0.983, L2=0.012, L∞=17
(g) ResNet-152: HC-1
PASS=0.992, L2=0.008, L∞=14
(h) ResNet-152: HC-13
PASS=0.997, L2=0.004, L∞=7
Figure 3: ADVERSARIAL IMAGES ON IMAGENET. Adversarial examples and perturbations for a “goldfish” generated by BVLC-
GoogLeNet and ResNet-152. Metrics are shown below images in form (PASS, L2 norm per pixel, L∞). (a) Fast Gradient Sign (FGS)
method with BVLC-GoogLeNet: classified as “starfish”, failed adversarial generation due to low PASS (b) Fast Gradient Value (FGV)
approach with BVLC-GoogLeNet: classified as “loggerhead turtle”, failed adversarial generation due to low PASS (c) Hot/Cold approach
with the most similar class (HC-1) on BVLC-GoogLeNet: adversarial classified as “mud turtle” (d) Hot/Cold approach with the 13th most
similar class (HC-13) on BVLC-GoogLeNet: adversarial classified as “box turtle” (e) Fast Gradient Sign (FGS) method with ResNet-
152: adversarial classified as “cock” (f) Fast Gradient Value (FGV) approach with ResNet-152: adversarial classified as “blowfish” (g)
Hot/Cold approach with the most similar class (HC-1) on ResNet-152: adversarial classified as “bee” (h) Hot/Cold approach with the
13th most similar class (HC-13) on ResNet-152: adversarial classified as “cock”. For better visualization, perturbations are scaled by a
factor of 10 with gray=no-change.
input image space that help move toward a target (hot) class
while moving away from the original (cold) class.
To formalize our hot/cold model, let h(x) ∈ Rn be the
features of the neural network’s penultimate layer for input
image x, and let y be the label for x. We construct a hot/cold
feature vector ωhc based upon h(x) as follows: First, we
define a target class y˜ 6= y as hot, i.e., we add features
exclusive to this class y˜ to input image by defining its cor-
responding value as |hy˜(x)|. Second, we identify class y as
cold with a value of−hy(x) as we intend to step away from
it by removing its exclusive features from the input image.
Thus the constructed penultimate layer feature vector is
ωhc(x) =

|hj(x)| if j = y˜
−hj(x) if j = y
0 otherwise.
(7)
To be able to target both similar and dissimilar classes of
input image x, we use scalar value |hj(x)| for the hot
class. Finally, as described below, we use backpropagation
to estimate the image changes needed to move according to
our constructed feature vector ωhc by computing the image
ηhc = Bl(ωhc). The operator Bl(·) is an approximation
to the derivative backpropagated down to the image level.
Sec 4.3 explains how this is conducted at intermediate lay-
ers. While any positive value for the hot class and any neg-
ative value for the cold class have beneficial effects in terms
of providing adversarial directions, we find that, in general,
values derived from the extracted feature vector of the orig-
inal image perform very well as they naturally capture the
relative scale of the respective class’s features.
As we can see in Fig. 2 for MNIST and in Fig. 3
for ImageNet, our hot/cold approach provides comparable
results (PASS) to the previously described FGV approach in
Sec. 4.1. However, with this new approach we can explic-
itly move in the direction of targeted classes obtaining sev-
eral different adversarial directions for each input image.
This greatly increases the adversarial diversity available for
training.
4.3 Implementation Details
For our adversarial generation implementations and exper-
iments, we use the popular deep learning framework Caffe
[10]. Caffe allows us to obtain inner representations of
images in neural networks and backpropagate feature repre-
sentations. However, Caffe’s backward method is limited
to start with features of the top layer. To perform back-
propagation of feature representations at deep(er) layers,
there are two options. First, we can create truncated net-
works, make a targeted layer sit at the top of each, and
then use the backward method to perform the backprop-
agations of interest. This approach is cumbersome. The
second approach is to modify the backward method to
directly backpropagate from any specified feature represen-
tations. By simply eliminating few lines of code responsible
for checking whether the specified starting point is the top
layer, we can use a single network for our experiments. This
is how we implement the backpropagation operator Bl(·).
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Figure 4: PASS SCORES. Example showing distributions of
PASS scores for different types of adversarial and hard positive
LeNet/MNIST images. The HC-D-X distributions use the hot/cold
approach (Sec.4.2) with X closest scoring classes, while HC-S-
X use the sign of the derivatives. HC-D-9-Y uses the derivatives
scaled by Y beyond the point of minimal adversarial PASS in the
direction of the derivatives. FGS is the fast gradient sign method of
[8]. These plots demonstrate that using sign instead of raw direc-
tions defined by derivatives significantly reduces PASS scores, e.g.,
compare HC-S-9 and HC-D-9. They also illustrate that even small
extensions beyond the minimal adversarial distance reduces PASS
as well. Finally, the plots show the sheer increase in number of
adversarials over the basic FGS approach.
Our novel approach for obtaining adversarial images cal-
culates feature-derivatives at any layer, and allow us to
obtain perturbations which define different directions with
respect to a given input image. We can search along those
directions for the closest perturbations that cause mislabel-
ing to obtain adversarial images or further extend this search
to obtain additional hard positives. Since we apply a given
direction as a perturbation to the input image, by scaling
the perturbation by larger and larger values and adding it to
the original image, we move the original image farther and
farther along that direction. In order to efficiently discover
the closest adversarial point in that direction, we apply a
line-search technique with increasing step-sizes. To find
adversarials, we search for the smallest possible adversarial
perturbation in the last section of line-search by applying a
binary search. Finally, we would like to emphasize that all
images we generate have discrete pixel-values in [0, 255].
5 Experiments
The focus of our experiments is threefold. First, we gen-
erate adversarial examples on LeNet/MNIST and collect
metrics to compare different algorithms in terms of L2 dis-
tances, L∞ distances, and PASS. Second, we demonstrate
that while PASS can be applied to complex images, “good”
thresholds for adversarial and hard positive examples vary
with the domain. Finally, we demonstrate on LeNet/MNIST
that retraining with a diverse set of hard positive images can
improve the original network’s performance more than just
0	
0.1	
0.2	
0.3	
0.4	
0.5	
0.6	
0.7	
0.8	
0.9	
1	
FGS	 FGV	 HC-1	 HC-2	 HC-3	 HC-4	 HC-5	 HC-6	 HC-7	 HC-8	 HC-9	
M
ea
su
re
	
Adversarial	Type	
Metrics	of	Adversarial	Types	
PASS	 L-2	 L-inf	
Figure 5: METRICS. Example showing various metrics (PASS,
L2, L∞) for different types of MNIST adversarial images gen-
erated on three LeNets. FGS, FGV, and HC-X denotes hot/cold
approaches targeting the Xth closest scoring classes. While adver-
sarials of FGV and our HC methods have higher L∞ distances,
they also have better PASS scores than FGS. For visualization both
L2 and L∞ distances are scaled so that max distances are 1.
training with adversarials generated via the FGS approach.
5.1 MNIST - Adversarial Metrics
Here we display metrics for various types of adversarial
examples generated on LeNets trained with the MNIST
dataset. Fig. 4 shows the distribution of PASS scores for
different types of adversarial images compared with FGS.
As we can see in Fig. 5, L2 and L∞ distances do not map
well to perceptual similarity as defined by PASS. For exam-
ple, while adversarial images generated by the FGS method
have noticeably lower L∞ distances than those generated
by the FGV method, adversarials of FGV maintain signifi-
cantly higher PASS.
5.2 MNIST - Training with Hard Positives
We show that fine-tuning with a diverse set of hard pos-
itive images enhances LeNet/MNIST’s robustness to such
examples and also improves its accuracy. We trained 3 dif-
ferent LeNet/MNIST networks with the standard 60K train-
ing samples and different random initializations/orderings
using the training parameters distributed with Caffe. While
many techniques are known to improve performance, e.g.
batch normalization and different objective functions, we
do not employ those approaches here as the goal is to eval-
uate the performance gains on a very standard network and
make it easy for others to replicate/compare.
For each network, we generated adversarial and hard
positive images of different types. We then fine-tuned each
network three times using different random orderings of the
adversarial training data, giving 9 different networks for
testing. Fine-tuning was for 20K iterations; the base net-
works were initially trained with 10K iterations.
To test, we used both the standard MNIST test data of
10K images and a set of 70K held-out adversarial and hard
positive images that were not used for training. The 70K
held-out set contained a broad mix of adversarial types, 5K
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Figure 6: PASS SCORES. Example showing how error on
both original and all adversarial MNIST test data varies for net-
works trained using generated hard positives with different ranges
of PASS scores. Note that networks trained on data with the high-
est PASS scores have higher MNIST test error and much higher
adversarial test error. Even though adversarial testing includes
data from all ranges, training using data only with PASS scores in
the 800-900 range still does well in adversarial testing.
each for 14 types: FGS [8], FGV (cf. Sec. 4.1), 9 types
of hot/cold approaches (cf. Sec. 4.2) from HC-1 to HC-9,
HC-1 scaled by 1.05, HC-1 scaled by 1.10, and adversari-
als of the hot/cold approach using signs of derivatives for
the closest scoring class. Training used adversarial images
from only the associated network on a subset of types. To
better test generalization, adversarial and hard positive test-
ing uses samples from all networks, thus the basic LeNets
do not show 100% error.
Table 1 shows the average accuracies for different test
models. These results are consistent both with the hypoth-
esis that increasing diversity improves training and the
hypothesis that PASS scores for hard positives should be
non-minimal, but not too large. By pushing the bound-
aries past the minimal adversarial images and closer to
the goal class, as graphically depicted as stars in Fig. 1,
HC-D-9-1.05, hard positives obtianed by scaling perturba-
tions of HC-1 to HC-9 adversarials (HC-D-9), generalizes
the boundaries more and thus increases accuracy over HC-
D-9 while significantly improving robustness to adversar-
ial images. The results in Fig. 6 demonstrate that train-
ing on images of intermediate PASS values produces bet-
ter results than training using only images with either the
highest or lowest PASS scores. To compare with state-
of-the-art adversarial training, we note that HC-D-9, HC-
D-9-1.05 and even FGV are significantly better than train-
ing with FGS images using the approach of [8]. The line
with * contains the results reported in [8] using a modified
adversarial-enhanced training objective, which is slightly
better than training with a finite set of FGS images. This
is likely because the objective function can take advantage
of a changing adversarial objective during training.
We also performed comparisons with approaches that
use other types of augmented data. We generated 1M
images with InfiMNIST [14] and trained three networks
for 30K iterations. We see that HC-D-9 and HC-D-9-1.05,
each of which are trained with approximately 340K adver-
MNIST Adversarial Method
.673%± .035 14.85% HC-D-9-1.05
.683%± .057 21.10% HC-D-9
.697%± .021 48.35% InfiMNIST (1M)
.697%± .031 29.61% FGV
.723%± .047 21.52% HC-D-5
.733%± .032 29.29% HC-S-5
.782% * 17.9%∗ Goodfellow et al. [8]
.790%± .122 31.06% FGS
.937%± .110 64.21% Basic LeNet
Table 1: ERROR RATES. Error rates of various adversarial and
hard positive trained networks on both MNIST and adversarial test
sets. Increasing adversarial diversity clearly improves results. The
best performing model, HC-D-9-1.05, using the hot/cold approach
with derivatives from all 9 classes to generate hard positives,
reduces the MNIST test error 28.18% over the basic LeNet and
14.81% over training with fast gradient sign (FGS) [8]. Note that
this model also has the lowest susceptibility to adversarial images
with an error rate of 14.85%.
sarial images, are slightly (but not statistically) better than
training on 1M images from InfiMNIST. FGV, trained with
37663 images, which is only 3.7% of the InfiMNIST data,
does equally as well. Furthermore, the InfiMNIST trained
networks also perform poorly on adversarial examples.
5.3 ImageNet - Adversarial Training
We conducted preliminary experiments using our diverse
adversarial approach to enhance the performance of BVLC-
GoogLeNet on the ImageNet dataset. Instead of training a
new network from scratch, we show that we can improve
the existing BVLC-GoogLeNet model by fine-tuning it with
diverse adversarial images. Because our focus is on using
hard positives to enhance learning, we take only the center
crop (which is used by the pre-trained BVLC-GoogLeNet).
We started by taking 15 correctly classified images per
class, and generated 20 different HC-types – from the most
similar (HC-1) to twentieth most similar (HC-20) class as
hot, yielding 300K images in total. We filtered out radi-
cal perturbations, keeping only the adversarial images with
PASS scores higher than 0.99. This yields approximately
250K hard positives for training. We then mixed the 250K
adversarial images with the original approximately 1.28M
center crops of the ImageNet training set. Our fine-tuning
procedure relies on original hyperparameters distributed
with the BVLC-GoogLeNet model in the Caffe Model Zoo.
We fine-tuned the original BVLC-GoogLeNet model for
500K iterations with batch size of 80, i.e. about 25 epochs.
We tested on center crops of the ImageNet validation set
and report top-1 and top-5 error rates. The top-1 error is
30.552%, and top-5 error rate is 10.604%. While this per-
formance is not state-of-the-art for ImageNet, our improve-
ment in top-1 error rate is 2.07e-4% per added image, and
our top-5 gain is 1.01e-4% per added image. As computed
from the data in [20], using 10 crops decreased their top-
5 error rate with 7.67e-6% per added image, while the use
of 144 crops reduced top-5 error by 1.26e-06% per added
image. Therefore, using our hard positives in training yields
greater improvement for each additional image.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced a new perceptual measure
for adversarial images, which allows us to explicitly quan-
tify the constraint that perturbations must be imperceptible
in order to form adversarial images. We have also intro-
duced novel ways of generating diverse adversarial images,
and have shown that amplifying adversarial images to create
additional hard positives can be used to augment training
datasets and further enhance accuracies over training with
adversarial images alone. Instead of looking like random
noise, many of our diverse adversarial perturbations exhibit
strong structural artifacts, which are far more likely to occur
naturally than perturbations of former adversarial genera-
tion methods that generally look like random noise.
Although we could not achieve state-of-the-art perfor-
mance on MNIST or ImageNet, our results on MNIST
are substantially better than those of any prior work
leveraging adversarial training or input perturbations on
LeNet/MNIST. Our approach also uses far fewer training
images and improves robustness to adversarial examples.
On ImageNet, we show compelling evidence to suggest that
using hard positive images in the training set offers sub-
stantially greater performance improvement per image than
using translated crops. We have shown adversarial images
generated on the state-of-the-art ResNet-152, which sug-
gests that our approach can likely be applied to improve the
state of the art.
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